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Construction Law
by Brian J. Morrissey*
and
Timothy N. Toler"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The decisions rendered by the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia
Court of Appeals during this one-year survey period included a small
opening in lender liability, a minimalist view of the requirements of
evidence as it pertains to the law of fraud, an extensive discussion of the
law of damages as it applies to construction contracts, and a harsh result
because of failure to comply with the requirements of the mechanic's and
materialmen's lien statute. This Article addresses these significant
movements in the law and some of the reaffirmations of existing law in
the construction field between June 1, 1998, and May 31, 1999.
II.

LENDER DUTIES AND LIABILITIES

A.

Disbursement of Funds
In ConstructionLender,Inc. v. Sutter,1 although it remanded the case
on other grounds, the court of appeals agreed with a trial court verdict
that a lender's president bound the lender by voluntarily undertaking a
duty to secure approval from the lender's borrowers before disbursing
loan funds to a building contractor.2 Construction Lender, Inc. ("TCL"),
in its loan documents with Robert and Sandra Sutter, declined to
undertake any duties with respect to the quality and performance of the
* Principal in the firm of Richelo, Morrissey & Toler, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson
College (B.A., 1978); University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (J.D., with honors, 1981).
Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Principal in the firm of Richelo, Morrissey & Toler, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.A., magna cum laude, 1980; J.D., 1983). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 228 Ga. App. 405, 491 S.E.2d 853 (1997).
2. Id. at 407, 491 S.E.2d at 856.
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construction work. After construction began, however, problems arose
with the general contractor's work, and the borrowers asked the lender
not to make any further disbursements without their approval. The
lender agreed and followed this procedure for the next three draws.
However, the lender paid the final draw without the borrowers' approval,
increasing the final contract price above the agreed amount of $211,500,
which the lender should have disbursed. The general contractor then
declared bankruptcy. At trial the borrowers presented evidence of
damages, including amounts paid in excess of the contract price, draws
paid without approval, and the costs of completing the house resulting
from delays in completion caused by the general contractor's abandonment of the job. These damages included removal of materialmen's
liens, the continued interest on the construction loan, and the refinancing of that loan to obtain additional construction funding.3
The borrowers presented their case to a jury on two tort theories: (1)
that the lender and its president had a duty to ensure that payments
made on the loan were timely and were for work actually performed; and
(2) that they negligently failed to discharge the duty voluntarily
undertaken to obtain the borrowers' approval before disbursing the final
loan amounts to the general contractor. After a jury verdict in favor of
the borrowers, the bank president and lender appealed the denials of
their motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.4
The court of appeals found that "'[wihere one undertakes an act which
he has no duty to perform and another reasonably relies upon that
undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or
reasonable care.'" 5 The lender, through its president, "voluntarily
undertook the duty to obtain approval from the ... [borrowers] before
The bank's
disbursing the ... [funds] and breached that duty."

president, as the person who personally spoke on behalf of the lender
and as an officer of the corporation, could also be personally responsible
for that tort.7 In essence, the bank's president created the duty and by
his actions breached that duty both on his own and the lender's behalf.
The court, however, found the duty was limited merely to obtaining
authorization before disbursal and did not encompass ensuring that
materialmen's liens were paid or that the work was properly completed
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 405-07, 491 S.E.2d at 855-56.
Id. at 406-07, 491 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 407, 491 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Stelts v. Epperson, 201 Ga. App. 405, 407, 411

S.E.2d 281, 282 (1991)).
6.
7.

Id.
Id. (citing Cherry v. Ward, 204 Ga. App. 833, 834, 420 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1992)); see
also Brian J. Morrissey, Construction Law, 47 MERCER L. REV. 87, 87-91 (1995).
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in whole or in part.' Accordingly, the court found that so long as the
amounts disbursed without authority would not have been paid to the
general contractor otherwise, the borrowers were entitled to recover
these amounts but not additional damages. 9 Consequential damages,
including the cost of completion and the additional expenses resulting
from the discharge of materialmen's liens and other personal expenses
incurred by the borrower, were not a reasonably foreseeable result of the
lender's breach of its voluntary duty.10
With respect to the alleged duty to ensure payment for work actually
performed, the court found it to be purely contractual in nature and not
an independent duty arising in tort." "Mere breach of the contract's
terms is insufficient to create a tort cause of action" unless one breaches
"an independent duty created by statute or common law." 2
B.

Fraud: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute

In Ali v. Fleet Finance, Inc. of Georgia,3 home purchasers sued a
lender for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Georgia's4
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute.
James Cooke made an initial purchase of a fire-damaged home from
Fleet Finance under an "as is" agreement. Cooke reportedly made
repairs on the home and remarketed it to Claudette and Dale Ali, also
under an "as is" agreement. After taking possession, Ali discovered
structural damage to beams, floors, and the roof, as well as electrical
and plumbing problems allegedly a result of fire damage. Ali contended
that Fleet Finance, as the mortgage holder on the property when Cooke
owned it, either knew or should have known about these defects and
failed to disclose them prior to the real estate closing. Fleet Finance
contended it had no liability whatsoever because its sole involvement

8. 228 Ga. App. at 407, 491 S.E.2d at 856.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 407-08, 491 S.E.2d at 856.
11. Id. at 409, 491 S.E.2d at 857-58.
12. Id., 491 S.E.2d at 858 (citing Mauldin v. Scheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874, 880, 150 S.E.2d
150, 153 (1966)). The court found this contractual duty was implied under Peterson v. First
Clayton Bank & Trust Co., 214 Ga. App. 94, 447 S.E.2d 63 (1994). Although it was dictum,
this discussion by the court of appeals may have cracked the armor protecting lenders who
undertake duties solely to protect their own interests in the loan proceeds and the security,
rather than any duty owed to the borrower. See Brian J. Morrissey, ConstructionLaw, 46
MERCER L. REV. 117, 118-21 (1994).
13. 232 Ga. App. 13, 500 S.E.2d 914 (1998).

14.

O.C.G.A. §§ 16-14-1 to -15 (1999).
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with Ali was as a lender under the assumed existing loan. The trial
court granted summary judgment to Fleet Finance.15
On appeal the court found no duty flowing from Fleet Finance to Ali
to disclose any known defects to the purchasers, limiting the doctrine of
passive concealment to residential builders and sellers only.16 Moreover, the court concluded that a creditor has "no duty to determine or
advise its debtor of the status of the collateral involved in the transaction."' 7
The court also summarily disposed of the RICO claim, finding that
Fleet Finance's involvement with Cooke in over one hundred properties
did not establish a pattern of racketeering activity or the requisite
unlawful predicate acts sufficient to establish a RICO claim.'"
C. Fraud: Truth in Lending
In Chandler v. MVM Construction, Inc.,"9 the court of appeals
reversed the grant of summary judgment to the lender in an action for
fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending Act. ° The borrowers,
William and Marie Chandler, sued MVM Construction ("MVM") and
Green Tree Financial Corporation ("Green Tree") for fraud on a home
improvement contract. The Chandlers and Green Tree signed a retail
installment contract, using the borrowers' home as security for the home
improvement contract. The Chandlers were both over seventy-five years
old, had extremely limited income, and were in poor health-Marie
Chandler had been bedridden for years. Neither of the Chandlers
graduated from high school, and William Chandler was barely literate.2
Under the Truth in Lending Act,22 a consumer has a right to rescind
a transaction "until midnight of the third business day following the
consummation of the transaction."2 3 If the seller does not properly
deliver or make the required notice or material disclosures, the
consumer's right to rescind is extended until three years after consum-

15. 232 Ga. App. at 13, 500 S.E.2d at 915.
16. Id. at 14, 500 S.E.2d at 915 (citing Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. Atlanta Econ. Dev. Corp., 195
Ga. App. 195, 198, 393 S.E.2d 44, 47 (1990)).
17. Id. (citing First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Hart, 185 Ga. App. 304, 305, 363 S.E.2d 832,833
(1987)).
18. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 915-16.
19. 232 Ga. App. 385, 501 S.E.2d 533 (1998).
20. Id. at 389, 501 S.E.2d at 536.
21. 232 Ga. App. at 385-86, 501 S.E.2d at 533.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
23. Id. § 1635(a); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (1998); 232 Ga. App. at 387, 501
S.E.2d at 534.
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mation of the transaction.24 The Chandlers claimed the contract they
signed did not contain a required schedule of due dates for periodic
payments and did not disclose the due and payable date of the first
installment.2 5 The court of appeals found sufficient factual issues to
create a jury question concerning the existence of these contractual
defects.26
Moreover, the retail installment contract itself imposed potential
liability on Green Tree. It allowed the debtor to assert against Green
Tree (the holder of the consumer credit contract) any defenses available
against MVM (the seller of the services or goods obtained).27 The
Chandlers alleged deficiencies and fraud in the performance of the home
improvement by MVM. 28 The court concluded that jury questions
existed as to whether the Chandlers, as a result of their infirm
conditions, illiteracy, and poor eyesight, used proper diligence to ensure
29
performance or to apprise themselves of the terms of the agreement.

III.
A.

CONTRACT FORMATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND BREACH

Contract Formation and Construction

In North Georgia Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. L & L Construction,
Inc.,3° the jury awarded the contractor repair costs of $100,000 in a
breach of contract claim against a concrete supplier. The contractor
claimed the supplier changed the agreed concrete design mix, resulting
in excessive curling and spalling. On appeal the supplier argued that
the trial court erroneously denied its motion for directed verdict because
the contractor failed to prove any express warranty regarding mix
design."'
The court of appeals noted that "'[alny description of the goods which
is made a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.'"3' 2 The contractor
presented evidence at trial showing that the parties orally agreed to a
concrete mix of at least eighty percent natural sand and a maximum of

24. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3); 232 Ga. App. at 387, 501
S.E.2d at 534 (citing Malfa v. Household Bank, 825 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (S.D. Fla. 1993)).
25. 232 Ga. App. at 387, 501 S.E.2d at 534.
26. Id. at 388, 501 S.E.2d at 535.
27. Id. at 388-89, 501 S.E.2d at 535.
28. Id. at 386, 501 S.E.2d at 534.
29. Id. at 389, 501 S.E.2d at 536.
30. 235 Ga. App. 68, 508 S.E.2d 722 (1998).
31. Id. at 69-71, 508 S.E.2d at 723-25.
32. Id. at 72, 508 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-2-313(1)(b)).
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twenty percent manufactured sand.33
The court construed this
description to be an express warranty pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 11-2313(1)(b) and found sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that the
supplier's failure to meet the contract specifications caused the concrete
to curl excessively.3 4
B.

Breach and Remedies

1. Action on Account. In Wheat Enterprises,Inc. v. Redi-Floors,
Inc.," the floor covering subcontractor sued the general contractor after
the general contractor refused to pay all invoices received for completed
work. The invoices included the work as initially bid, as well as changes
and additional work. The subcontractor claimed a right of recovery
based on contract, commercial account, and quantum meruit. At trial
the general contractor unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict on the
claim based on commercial account.3 6 The jury awarded damages to
the subcontractor, although the question of whether the jury calculated
damages based on contract, commercial
account, or some combination of
37
both could not be determined.
The court of appeals found that the subcontractor presented evidence
showing the parties intended their relationship to extend beyond their
contract and that the general contractor "requested, assented to, and
accepted" the work, thereby supporting the claim for commercial account
under O.C.G.A. section 7-4-16.3' The trial court properly determined
the debt to be liquidated because the general contractor discussed and
approved the debt prior to its incursion. 39
2. Rescission of Real Estate Contract. In Simmons v. Pilkenton,40 a purchaser filed a claim to rescind an installment land sale
contract, alleging fraud in the inducement and a mistaken belief that the
property included 1.5 acres. The superior court, on de novo review of the
magistrate court's ruling, rescinded the contract because the purchaser
had not received what he bargained for because of the seller's acknowl-

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id., 508 S.E.2d at 725.
Id., 508 S.E.2d at 726.
231 Ga. App. 853, 501 S.E.2d 30 (1998).
Id. at 853-55, 501 S.E.2d at 33-34.
Id. at 853 n.1, 501 S.E.2d at 33 n.1.
Id. at 856, 501 S.E.2d at 35.

39. Id.
40.

230 Ga. App. 900, 497 S.E.2d 613 (1998).
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edged mistake concerning the advertised acreage of the property.4 1 The
42
court of appeals granted the seller's petition for discretionary review.
To obtain rescission based on fraud in the inducement, a plaintiff must
show all the elements of fraud.43 Although the seller admitted misrepresenting the acreage in advertising the property, this admission did not
relieve the purchaser of his burden to prove the essential elements of
justifiable reliance on the seller's misrepresentation." In the purchase
and sale of real estate, absent a special relationship, one cannot be
permitted to claim that he has been deceived by false representations
when he could have learned the truth and avoided damage.45 To show
justifiable reliance, plaintiffs must show that they exercised due
diligence to learn the truth.4 6 A plat, referenced in the contract's
property description, depicted the correct acreage and was purportedly
attached to the contract.47 Plaintiff's failure to exercise due diligence
rendered rescission based on fraud, or even mutual mistake of fact,
improper.48
In Akins v. Couch,49 home buyers sued the sellers, the sellers' real
estate agent, and the agent's firm for rescission of the sales contract and
for compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court decided in favor
of defendants, determining that the buyers had not exercised due
diligence and had waived their rescission claim by procuring a loan
secured by a second security deed on the property during the pendency
of the lawsuit.5"
The supreme court reversed, stating that one person seeking rescission
may not abide by the contract and nonetheless bring an action for
rescission.5" However, "[hiere, the [buyers] promptly sought rescission
and, although they executed a second security deed, they also retained
52
the right to have it cancelled at any time upon payment of the debt."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
S.E.2d
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 900-01, 497 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 901, 497 S.E.2d at 615.
Id.
Id.
Id., 497 S.E.2d at 616 (citing Fowler v. Overby, 233 Ga. App. 803, 803-04, 478
919, 921 (1996)).
Id.
Id. at 902, 497 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
271 Ga. 276, 518 S.E.2d 674 (1999).
Id. at 277, 518 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. at 278, 518 S.E.2d at 675.
Id. (citing Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 685, 132 S.E. 442, 448 (1925)).
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The issue of the buyers' intent to affirm the sales contract was a
question for the jury.53
The evidence showed that the sellers failed to disclose septic system
problems to the buyers despite actual knowledge of the problems.5 4
The sellers' real estate agent denied that any problems existed when
specifically asked by the buyers' agent.55 The supreme court held that
the issues of the buyers' justifiable reliance upon the alleged misrepresentation, and whether the purchasers exercised due diligence in
inspecting the property, were also questions of fact for the jury.5
3.

Damages.

In MARTA v. Green International,Inc.,5" the court

of appeals reviewed the sufficiency of evidence supporting an award of
damages for cost overruns and extra work resulting from defective plans
and specifications." In this case, a replacement contractor and its
surety brought a breach of contract action against the Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ("MARTA") seeking damages on the
Kensington Transit Station construction project. The trial court entered
judgment on a jury verdict awarding plaintiffs $2.8 million. MARTA
appealed the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial, asserting that plaintiffs did not show
damages proximately caused by contract defects.59
Plaintiffs' evidence showed that MARTA's designs were severely
flawed. At trial plaintiffs' expert set out three methods by which
damages could be calculated."0 MARTA argued that plaintiffs used "the
'total cost method' or 'modified total cost method.' MARTA contended
both that this method is 'universally disfavored' and that [plaintiffs]
failed to meet the four-part test required by courts that recognize it." 1
Plaintiffs
denied that they used this method in proving their damag62
es.
The court of appeals noted that whether plaintiffs used this method
is irrelevant to the standard of proof for causation or damages under
Georgia law. 63

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Damages may be estimated with reasonable certainty

Id., 518 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 277, 518 S.E.2d at 675.
Id.
Id. at 278, 518 S.E.2d at 676.
235 Ga. App. 419, 509 S.E.2d 674 (1998).
Id. at 420, 509 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 419-20, 509 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 420-22, 509 S.E.2d at 676-77.
Id. at 422 n.1, 509 S.E.2d at 677 n.1.
Id.
Id.
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despite difficulty in fixing the exact amount." "'Thus, if a plaintiff can
show with reasonable certainty the total amount of damages and the
degree to which those damages are attributable to defendant, that is
sufficient to support an award.'" 5 When a defendant clearly causes a
substantial portion of the loss, a plaintiff will not be limited to an award
of only those damages which are shown to result solely from the
defendant's particular breaches.66
The trial court, therefore, was
correct in denying MARTA's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and for new trial.67
In Dill v. Chastain," the court of appeals reviewed the evidentiary
support for an award of damages on a breach of contract action brought
by a residential contractor against a homeowner.69 The homeowner
replaced the contractor during construction and refused to pay more
than a portion of the total contract amount. The contractor sued for the
contract balance and was awarded $13,878.87. 70
The homeowner appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for a
directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
arguing that the contractor did not establish the amount required to
finish the project. 71 The court of appeals agreed, noting that "[wihen
a construction contract is wrongfully breached, the basic component of
damages is the net profit the contractor would have received had full
performance been permitted."7 2 The contractor's failure to put into
evidence the amount he would have expended to complete the project
was fatal to his claim. 7' Nor was the contractor entitled to prove his
damages by relying upon the project completion costs of the homeown74
er.
4. Evidence: Continuing Witness and Business Records. In
MARTA v. Green International, Inc. 7' a completion contractor and
surety sued MARTA for cost overruns and extra work resulting from

64. Id. at 422-23, 509 S.E.2d at 678.
65. Id. at 423, 509 S.E.2d at 678 (quoting CRS Sirrine v. Dravo Corp., 219 Ga. App.
301, 302-03, 464 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1995)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 234 Ga. App. 770, 507 S.E.2d 872 (1998).
69. Id. at 770, 507 S.E.2d at 873.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 770-71, 507 S.E.2d at 873.
72. Id. at 771, 507 S.E.2d at 873.
73. Id.
74. Id., 507 S.E.2d at 873-74.

75. 235 Ga. App. 419, 509 S.E.2d 674 (1998).
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defective plans and specifications on a transit station construction
project. At trial plaintiffs sought to admit into evidence copies of project
drawings with seventy-six pages of a witness's narrative describing
different problems on the job. The trial court sustained MARTA's
objection that the exhibit constituted a "continuing witness." Plaintiffs
then removed the narrative and submitted only the plans with certain
sections highlighted in yellow. The trial court admitted the modified
exhibit over objection on the same ground.76
On appeal the court reviewed the rationale underlying the continuing
witness rule. 7 The jury hears written testimony when read from the
witness stand in the same way it hears oral testimony when presented
from the witness stand.7" However, allowing the jury to reference
written testimony again during deliberation, while it receives oral
79
testimony only once, places undue emphasis on the written testimony.
This rule has been applied to affidavits, depositions, written dying
declarations, and written confessions. ° However, the rule "does not
apply to items of evidence such as drawings or other documents which
are 'demonstrative evidence that serve only to illustratetestimony given
by the witnesses."' 8' Thus, the trial court properly allowed the project
drawings to go out with the jury. 2
MARTA also appealed the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence
a handwritten document discovered in the contractor's files. The
document was not signed, and MARTA admitted it could not find anyone
who could identify the document or give information about its creation. 3 The court noted that O.C.G.A. section 24-3-14(b)
"requires that a foundation be laid through the testimony of a witness
who is familiar with the method of keeping the records and who can
testify thereto and to facts which show that the entry was made in the
regular course of ...business
at the time of the event or within a
84
reasonable time thereafter."

76. Id. at 419-20, 424, 509 S.E.2d at 676, 679.
77. Id. at 424, 509 S.E.2d at 679.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 424-25, 509 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting Gabbard v. State, 233 Ga. App. 122, 124,
503 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1998)).
82. Id. at 425, 509 S.E.2d at 679.
83. Id. at 426, 509 S.E.2d at 680.
84. Id. (quoting Nalley Northside Chevrolet v. Herring, 215 Ga. App. 185, 186, 450
S.E.2d 452, 454 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Because MARTA presented no such testimony, the trial court properly
excluded the handwritten document from evidence.8 5
5. Limitation of Actions. In Hardaway Co. v. Parsons,Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc.,"8 the general contractor sued the project
design engineer for economic losses resulting from negligent misrepresentations made by
the engineer, who was not in privity with the
87
general contractor.
The supreme court was asked to determine when a cause of action
accrues in this type of suit.88 The court of appeals held that the action
accrued when the general contractor entered into the contract and at
least partially relied on misrepresentations. 9 The supreme court
reversed, however, holding that the negligence action accrued only when
the economic loss was certain and ascertainable, not speculative." The
supreme court found that the court of appeals erred in overlooking an
essential requirement that, to maintain its action, Hardaway must have
suffered economic loss.9 Until Hardaway incurred that economic loss
with certainty, and not merely as a matter of speculation, its claim did
not accrue, and thus, the limitations period did not commence.92
Accordingly, the cause of action accrued once economic loss occurred, and
93
Hardaway had four years before it was required to file its complaint.
Likewise, in Travis Pruitt & Associates, PC. v. Bowling,9 4 the court
of appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment to defendant on the
statute of limitations defense. 9 In this case, the purchaser filed suit
within four years after her property flooded, the date she claimed she
first suffered injury as a result of defects in the construction. Travis
Pruitt & Associates argued that the statute of limitations began to run
on the date of substantial completion.9 The court found, "The true test
to determine when a cause of action accrues is to ascertain the time

85. Id.
86. 267 Ga. 424, 479 S.E.2d 727 (1997).
87. Id. at 424, 479 S.E.2d at 728.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 425-26, 479 S.E.2d at 728-29.
92. Id. at 426, 479 S.E.2d at 729.
93. Id. at 426-28, 479 S.E.2d at 729-30. O.C.G.A. section 9-3-31, which provides a fouryear limitation period for actions claiming injuries to personalty, was applicable in this
instance because the claims were for economic losses. Id. at 426, 479 S.E.2d at 729.
94. 238 Ga. App. 225, 518 S.E.2d 453 (1999).
95. Id. at 225, 518 S.E.2d at 454.
96. Id.
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when the plaintiff could first have maintained her action to a successful
result."" This finding is seemingly in conflict with the general rule
that "a cause of action based on negligent design and construction
accrues and the statute of limitation begins to run at the time the
project is substantially completed."" However, the general rule is
premised upon situations in which the negligence in the design gives rise
immediately to ascertainable damages of some variety.99 That rationale does not apply to cases such as Bowling, in which the negligence in
the construction occurred on a neighboring property and in which the
instrumentality that caused the damage may have existed for a number
of years but the damages occurred within the four-year statute of
limitations.1°°
IV. TORT LIABILITY

A.

Negligence

1. Premises Liability. In Clemmons v. Griffin,'' a repairman
sued the homeowner in negligence for injuries he sustained when the air
conditioning unit he was repairing exploded. The repairman claimed
that the homeowner breached a duty to warn him that an individual
who was not competent to rewire the air conditioning unit had done so
prior to his inspection.102 "[A] homeowner has a duty to warn an
invitee ... of dangers or defects of which the owner knew or in the

Howevexercise of ordinary care it was the owner's duty to know."'
er, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the homeowner because the repairman failed to come forward with specific evidence
that the homeowner had superior knowledge of the hazard.' °4
2. Negligent Inspection/Limitation of Liability Clause. In
°5
Redding
a home inspector
for negligent
inspectionv. ofTanner,'
the homeappellants
they were sued
purchasing.
The inspector
failed to

97. Id. at 226, 518 S.E.2d at 454 (citing U-Haul Co. & C. v. Abreu & Robeson, Inc., 247

Ga. 565, 566, 277 S.E.2d 497, 499 (1981)).
98. Id. (citing Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 258 Ga. 365, 366, 368
S.E.2d 732, 733 (1994)).

99. Id.
100. Id.
101.

230 Ga. App. 721, 498 S.E.2d 99 (1998).

102. Id. at 721, 498 S.E.2d at 100.
103. Id. at 722, 498 S.E.2d at 100.
104. Id. at 723, 498 S.E.2d at 101.
105. 231 Ga. App. 250, 498 S.E.2d 156 (1998).
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note substantial cracks in the brick covering the gables.1" 6 In granting
summary judgment for the inspector, the trial court relied upon
Brainard v. McKinney' 7' and the following waiver of liability clause
contained in the written inspection report:
"This inspection and report does not cover all aspects, even of
structural conditions. Neither TLC Home Inspections nor the inspector
shall be liable for mistakes, omissions, or errors in judgment. This
limitation of liability shall include and apply to all consequential
damages,... and property damage of any nature. This company and

the inspector assume no responsibility for the cost of repairing or
replacing any unreported defects or conditions."'0 8
The court of appeals distinguished Brainardon the ground that the
home purchaser in that case signed a written contract containing the
waiver clause. 9 Although Brainardheld a similar clause enforceable
and not void as against public policy, the written document in Redding
was prepared only after the parties orally agreed to the inspection and
after the inspection was completed." 0 Furthermore, the purchasers
had not signed the inspection report containing the limitation of liability
clause."'
The court of appeals also rejected the inspector's argument that the
claim was barred under the doctrine of "avoidable consequences." 2
The inspector argued that because the purchaser observed during the
inspection that the inspector did not climb onto the roof to inspect the
gables, the purchaser did not exercise ordinary care in protecting himself
from the inspector's negligence." 3 The court found that the homeowners were fully entitled to trust the inspector 4to perform the necessary
procedures to inspect the property correctly.1
B.

Fraudand Other Torts

1. Fraud. In Smalls v. Blueprint Development, Inc.,"' the house
purchasers sued a seller and developer, asserting fraud, constructive

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 250-51, 498 S.E.2d at 157.
220 Ga. App. 329, 469 S.E.2d 441 (1996).
231 Ga. App. at 251, 498 S.E.2d at 157.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251-52, 498 S.E.2d at 157-58.
Id. at 251, 498 S.E.2d at 157-58.
Id. at 252, 498 S.E.2d at 158.
230 Ga. App. 556, 497 S.E.2d 54 (1998).
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fraud, and negligent construction because of defendants' alleged failure
to disclose that their houses were built on property designated as
wetlands. The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the
fraud claims, finding that plaintiffs, as a matter of law, failed to exercise
due diligence by not investigating whether their homes were built on
wetlands or land previously designated as wetlands.11
The court of appeals affirmed.'
The "passive concealment exception to the general rule of caveat emptor ... is concerned with concealed
defects that purchasers in the exercise of due diligence could not
detect."" 8 Although the real estate sales contracts executed by
plaintiffs contained specific terms that alerted them to the possibility
that the property might be subject to wetlands regulation, plaintiffs
failed to take any affirmative action to investigate the status of their
property." 9 Plaintiffs' failure to present evidence of the exercise of due
diligence to discover the alleged fraud was fatal to their fraud
claims. 12

2. Fraud/Attorney Fees. In Gantt v. Bennett,"2 ' home purchasers
asserted fraud and state RICO claims against several defendants
regarding a defective septic system. The purchasers sued the builderseller, the Forsyth County inspector who issued the permit on the septic
system, the Forsyth County Board of Health, a land surveyor who
conducted percolation tests, and the installer of the septic tank. The
jury returned a verdict against the builder, the county inspector, and the
Board of Health on the purchasers' fraud claims. The jury found that
the land surveyor and installer were not liable to the purchasers. The
trial court granted the land surveyor's motion for attorney fees against
the purchasers pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14.122
The builder, county inspector, and Board of Health appealed the trial
court's denial of their motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial
on the fraud claims. 123 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling, finding sufficient evidence of fraud to support the jury's
verdict. 124 With respect to the builder, the court found sufficient
evidence from which the jury could conclude that the builder knew that

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 556, 497 S.E.2d at 55.
Id., 497 S.E.2d at 56.
Id. at 557, 497 S.E.2d at 56.
Id. at 558, 497 S.E.2d at 56-57.
Id., 497 S.E.2d at 57.
231 Ga. App. 238, 499 S.E.2d 75 (1998).
Id. at 238-40, 499 S.E.2d at 77-78.
Id. at 240, 242, 499 S.E.2d at 78, 80.
Id.
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the septic system had been located in ground water and improper soils
that would cause it to break down.'25 The court noted that "'IfIraud
may not be presumed but, being in itself subtle, slight circumstances
may be sufficient to carry conviction of its existence. '""'26 Further,
"[Iln cases of passive concealment by the seller of defective realty, we
find there to be an exception to the rule of caveat emptor. Seller [has]
a duty to disclose in situations where he or she has special knowledge
not apparent to the buyer and is aware that the buyer is acting under
a misapprehension as to facts which would be important to the buyer
and would probably affect its decision."' 27
The county inspector admitted that he had not performed the required
visual inspection of the septic system prior to submitting his report and
issuing the permit. The inspector issued the permit by looking at the
contractor's drawing. Evidence showed that the inspector completed
similar false reports on a number of other houses in the same subdivision. The fraud claims against the Board of Health were a by-product
of the purchasers' claims against the inspector.'28 The court of appeals
found129the evidence of fraud sufficient to create an issue of fact for the

jury.

The inspector and the Board of Health also argued that the four-year
statute of limitations barred the purchasers' fraud claims. The
purchasers responded that the statute was tolled under O.C.G.A. section
13 0
9-3-96 because of defendants' wrongful concealment of the problem.
The court of appeals agreed.' Evidence showed that the amendment
to the purchasers' complaint that added the county inspector as a
defendant was filed within four years of the date the purchasers first
the county that the septic system had never, in fact,
received notice from
32
been inspected.'

The court of appeals reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees
to the land surveyor on the purchasers' RICO claim. 133 Because the
trial court denied the land surveyor's motions for summary judgment
and for a directed verdict on this claim, imposition of sanctions under

125. Id. at 241, 499 S.E.2d at 79.
126. Id. at 240, 499 S.E.2d at 79 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-57).
127. Id. at 240-41, 499 S.E.2d at 79 (quoting Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, 818,
232 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1976)).
128. Id. at 243, 249, 499 S.E.2d at 80, 81, 85.
129. Id. at 242, 499 S.E.2d at 80.
130. Id. at 244, 499 S.E.2d at 81.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 245, 499 S.E.2d at 82.
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O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 was improper.14
This case was not so
unusual that the trial court could award attorney fees after refusing the
party's motion for a directed verdict.135
In a strong dissent, Judge Blackburn, joined by Chief Judge Andrews,
took exception to the majority's ruling on the purchasers' fraud
claims. 3 '
"'[I]n a fraudulent concealment action the allegedly
defrauded party must prove that the alleged defrauder had actual, not
merely constructive, knowledge of the fact concealed."" 3
Although
expert testimony showed that defendant "should have known" the septic
system would fail, this evidence was not enough, in the dissenter's
opinion, to prove defendant's actual knowledge. 3 '
With respect to the evidence of fraud against the inspector, the dissent
noted that testimony indicated the inspectors would examine the
contractor's plans for the septic system and accept or refuse the septic
system according to the contractor's drawing if time did not permit the
inspectors to complete an inspection at the site. 3 s The inspectors
believed this procedure was approved. 4 ° Thus, the dissent found, the
purchasers did not show that the inspector made a false representation
with the intention4 and purpose of deceiving them, which is an essential
element of fraud.' '
3. RICO. In Maddox v. Southern Engineering Co.,142 the court of
appeals reviewed the proximate cause element needed for standing to
sue under the Georgia RICO Act."
Plaintiff landowner sued an
engineering company, a county water authority, and other defendants,
alleging a RICO violation. The water authority had arranged for the
engineering firm to help obtain a construction permit for a dam and
reservoir upstream from plaintiff's property. Plaintiff asserted that
defendants had intentionally submitted fraudulent documents to state
agencies to obtain their construction permit. This violated O.C.G.A.
section 16-10-20, resulting in a depreciation of property value. Plaintiff
argued these offenses constituted the predicate acts needed to show a

134. Id.
135. Id. at 246, 499 S.E.2d at 82 (citing Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 422, 405 S.E.2d
31, 33 (1991)).
136. Id. at 247-50, 499 S.E.2d at 83-85 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 248, 499 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Lively v. Garnick, 160 Ga. App. 591, 592,287
S.E.2d 553, 555 (1981)).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 249, 499 S.E.2d at 84.
140. Id.
141. Id., 499 S.E.2d at 84-85.
142. 231 Ga. App. 802, 500 S.E.2d 591 (1998).
143. Id. at 802, 500 S.E.2d at 592.
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pattern of racketeering activity under subsections (8) and (9) of
O.C.G.A. section 16-14-3.'" In an earlier appeal of this case, the court
of appeals ruled that these statutory violations can constitute the
predicate acts for a RICO claim.'45 Plaintiff then appealed the trial
court's grant of summary4judgment
for defendants on the ground that
6
plaintiff lacked standing.

Georgia's civil RICO statute provides, "Any person who is injured by
reason of any violation of Code Section 16-14-4 shall have a cause of
action for three times the actual damages sustained and, where
appropriate, punitive damages." 47 Looking to federal authority, the
court noted that "the language 'by reason of' imposes a proximate
causation requirement on the plaintiff."141 Moreover, a plaintiff must
show that the injury flowed directly from the alleged predicate offense
and was not merely an eventual consequence of the act. 149 Merely
showing that the plaintiff would not have been injured "but for" the
defendant's act is insufficient. 5 ° The trial court's grant of summary
judgment was proper because plaintiff could not show that the state
agencies relied on the misrepresentations or that the depreciation of
plaintiff's property value was a direct result of those misrepresentations. 5'
C.

Workers' Compensation--GeneralContractor'sTort Immunity
The supreme court reviewed two challenges to a general contractor's
tort immunity under workers' compensation laws. In Warden v. Hoar
Construction Co.,152 the deceased employee's wife sued the general
contractor for the wrongful death of her husband. Appellant's husband,
an employee of a subcontractor, died from injuries sustained after he fell
from a roof while building a church. Appellant received workers'
compensation benefits from the subcontractor. The trial court granted
summary judgment because of the general contractor's immunity from
tort liability as a recognized statutory employer.'5 3

144. Id. at 802-04, 500 S.E.2d at 592-93.
145. Id. at 804, 500 S.E.2d at 593.
146. Id. at 802, 500 S.E.2d at 592.
147. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c) (1999) (emphasis added).
148. 231 Ga. App. at 805, 500 S.E.2d at 594 (citing O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887 F.2d 1557,
1561 (11th Cir. 1989)).
149. Id. at 806, 500 S.E.2d at 594.
150. Id.
151. Id., 500 S.E.2d at 594-95.
152. 269 Ga. 715, 507 S.E.2d 428 (1998).
153. Id. at 715, 507 S.E.2d at 429.
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On appeal the supreme court was asked to overturn its holding in
Wright Associates v. Rieder,"" in which the court held that, pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-11, a subcontractor's injured employee could not
sue in tort against the general contractor for the general contractor's
nonpayment of workers' compensation benefits. 5 ' The supreme court
declined, noting that "[tihe General Assembly has amended the exclusive
remedy provision twice since 1981, but has chosen not to overturn the
tort immunity granted general contractors in Rieder."'56 Because the
legislature is presumed to know how the courts have interpreted a
statute, its failure to amend the statute allows the court to posit that the
legislature desired no change in the law." 7
However, in FlintElectric Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Construction
Co.,"'8 the supreme court denied immunity to a general contractor for
a third party's claim for indemnity under a separate statute. 159 The
contractor's employee was injured when a crane made contact with Flint
Electric's high voltage line. After receiving workers' compensation
benefits from the contractor, the employee and his wife sued Flint
Electric for personal injury and loss of consortium."6
Flint Electric sued for indemnification from the contractor under the
High-voltage Safety Act,'' which states that anyone who operates
near high-voltage lines and fails to follow the safety provisions in the
statute is strictly liable when injury results and must indemnify the
owner of the power line against ensuing claims." 2 The supreme court
rejected the contractor's claim of tort immunity, holding that Flint
Electric's statutory indemnity action was "comparable to the contractual
indemnity actions the courts have recognized as exceptions to the
[Workers' Compensation Act's] exclusivity provision."6 3

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981).
269 Ga. at 716, 507 S.E.2d at 429-30.
Id. at 716-17, 507 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 716-18, 507 S.E.2d at 430-31.
270 Ga. 464, 511 S.E.2d 160 (1999).
Id. at 466, 511 S.E.2d at 162.

160. Id. at 464, 511 S.E.2d at 161.
161.

O.C.G.A. §§ 46-3-30 to -40 (1992).

162. 270 Ga. at 464, 511 S.E.2d at 161.
163. Id. at 465, 511 S.E.2d at 162.
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A.

MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

Notice Requirement for Commencement of Action Against Owner

In Northside Wood Flooring, Inc. v. Borst,"M which was two cases
consolidated for appeal, suppliers of home construction materials filed
materialmen's liens, commenced actions against the general contractors,
and sued the property owners subsequent to the filing of bankruptcy by
the contractors. The facts were similar in each action. Each supplier
provided materials for the construction of a home directly to the general
contractor; each filed a lien against the property and commenced an
action against the general contractor in timely fashion; the general
contractor in each instance filed bankruptcy, and no judgment was
obtained; and the suppliers did not commence an action against the
owner of the property within twelve months after the claim became due,
nor did they file notice of the suit against the owner. 6 ' In each case,
the trial court granted summary judgment against the lien claimant."
The court of appeals reviewed the statutory framework.' 67 O.C.G.A.
section 44-14-361.1(a)(3) provides that "a materialman must commence
an action to recover the amount of the claim within 12 months of the
time the claim becomes due and he must, within 14 days of filing the
action, file a notice of the suit."6 ' O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(a)(4)
further provides that,
where a contractor is adjudicated bankrupt or, if after an action is
filed, no final judgment can be obtained against the contractor because
of his adjudication in bankruptcy, the materialman need not file an
action or obtain judgment against the contractor before enforcing a lien
against the improved property ....
[Tihe materialman may enforce the
lien directly against the property by filing an action against the owner
within 12 months from the time the lien becomes due. It also states
that the lien claimant, within 14 days after filing the action, must file
a notice of the action .... 169
The suppliers both argued that because they filed notices of suits against
the general contractor when they commenced their actions, the

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
against
169.

232 Ga. App. 569, 502 S.E.2d 508 (1998).
Id. at 569-70, 502 S.E.2d at 508-09.
Id. at 570, 502 S.E.2d at 509.
Id. at 570-72, 502 S.E.2d at 509-10.
Id. O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(a)(3) makes no reference to obtaining judgment
the contractor or subcontractor with whom the lien claimant is in privity.
232 Ga. App. at 570-71, 502 S.E.2d at 509.
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provisions of O.C.G.A. section 44-14-361.1(a)(4) did not apply. 7 ° -The
court of appeals found that while the suppliers properly brought their
actions against the general contractors under subsection (a)(3), they
clearly brought their actions against the property owners under
subsection (a)(4). 17 Consequently, the failure to strictly follow the
provisions of (a)(4) precluded recovery and enforcement of their
liens.172

Interestingly, this strict adherence to the provisions of subsection
(a)(4) appears at variance with the supreme court's decision in Melton
v. Pacific Southern Mortgage Trust. 73 In that case, a proof of claim
timely filed in the bankruptcy action of the general contractor was held
to obviate the requirement of filing suit against the property owner
within the twelve-month period. 74 Thus, the action that was later
commenced against the property owner was still deemed timely.7 '
ContractualRelationship-Authorizationto Perform Work
In McDaniel v. Hensons" Inc.,"17 a contractor sued a timber company
and a landowner in an attempt to recover for cleaning up a landfill at
the timber company's direction. The landowner appealed an adverse
jury verdict. The landowner had agreed to provide the timber company
with $50,000 in "seed money" to clean up the property that contained
organic materials. Hensons' entered into an agreement with the timber
company to perform the clearing effort, which the landowner estimated
could cost up to $300,000. The timber company required Hensons' to
complete lien releases that indicated the timber company was the
owner's agent. Despite the fact that the landowner had informed the
timber company that Hensons' had expended the $50,000 and that the
landowner did not intend to fund any further operations, Hensons'
continued to work with the landowner's knowledge. The timber company
failed to pay Hensons' for work performed after thirty-five to forty
percent of the project had been completed. Hensons' filed a lien against
the property and commenced an action against the landowner and the
the timber company was
timber company. Defendants disputed whether
77
an agent or an independent contractor.
B.

170. Id. at 571, 502 S.E.2d at 509.
171. Id. The court also stated, "[C]ompliance with one section of the lien statute does
not eliminate the need to comply with another section." Id., 502 S.E.2d at 510.
172. Id.
173. 241 Ga. 589, 247 S.E.2d 76 (1978).
174. Id. at 593, 247 S.E.2d at 79.
175. Id.
176. 229 Ga. App. 213, 493 S.E.2d 529 (1997).
177. Id. at 214, 493 S.E.2d at 530.
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The evidence showed that the landowner allowed the timber company
to supervise work on the property, erect a construction trailer, require
lien waivers, and secure a building permit, and the landowner made
payments to the timber company on invoices submitted by the timber
company for work under its supervision.178 The court of appeals found
that even if the timber company had acted without authority, the
landowner ratified the unapproved act by requiring and obtaining the
lien releases after it had paid the timber company for work performed
by Hensons'.'79 "Ratification may occur by the principal's partial
With the
payment on an allegedly unauthorized agreement." 8 °
landowner's approval or ratified acceptance, the lien was enforceable as
an improvement to the landowner's property. 8'
C.

Extinguishment of Lien-Sale to Bona Fide Purchaser

In Shockley Plumbing Co. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South),182 plaintiff,
Shockley Plumbing, appealed the grant of summary judgment to
defendant, NationsBank, concerning the attempted enforcement of a
5
In affirming the grant of
materialmen's lien against NationsBank."'
summary judgment, the court of appeals found that a bona fide sale to
a purchaser who had given valuable consideration and who lacked
knowledge or notice of the lien extinguished the lien right against the
bona fide purchaser." In this case, the owner of the property received
valuable consideration from NationsBank in exchange for a warranty
deed."8 5 Despite the fact that NationsBank was the construction
lender on the project, it did not have actual or constructive knowledge
of any attempt by the landowner to defraud its creditors, including the
lien was extinguished as to the bona
lien claimant.8 6 Accordingly, the
7
fide purchaser, NationsBank.1

178. Id. at 215, 493 S.E.2d at 531.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Pioneer Concrete Pumping Serv. v. T & B Scottdale Contractors, 218
Ga. App. 596, 597, 462 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1995)). When an agent exceeds his authority, "the
principal may not ratify in part and repudiate in part; he shall adopt either the whole or
none." O.C.G.A. § 10-6-51 (1994).
181. 229 Ga. App. at 215-16, 493 S.E.2d at 531-32.
182. 229 Ga. App. 60, 493 S.E.2d 227 (1997).
183. Id. at 60-61, 493 S.E.2d at 228.
184. Id. at 62-63, 493 S.E.2d at 229.
185. Id. at 62, 493 S.E.2d at 229.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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SURETY BOND AND GUARANTOR ISSUES

A.

Public Works Bonds-Failureof Public Body to Obtain Bonds
In DeKalb County v.J & A Pipeline Co.,18 the supreme court
examined, adversely to the interests of the subcontractor, the duty
imposed upon a public body when presented with performance and
payment bonds.189 To meet the statutory requirement, the public body
was to review the payment bond to determine whether it was "'taken in
the manner and form required in this Code section.'""9 The supreme
court determined that a payment bond was "taken 'in the manner'
required" when it was "presented to, approved by and filed with the
appropriate county official ...[and] when it purports, on its face," to
secure the obligation of the general contractor to make payment "for the
use and protection of subcontractors and materialmen."' 9 '
Following the supreme court's decision in J & A Pipeline Co., the
legislature amended the controlling statutes, imposing an additional
duty on governmental entities in the approval process to examine the
form and "the solvency of the surety by the officer of the state, county,
municipal corporation, or public board or body who negotiates the
contract on behalf of the public entity. Said approval shall be obtained
prior to the bid's being accepted."' 92
As a result of this amendment, the court of appeals held in Hall
County School District v. C. Robert Beals & Associates'93 that a public
body that fails to discharge its obligations, including examining the
solvency of the surety, exposes itself to a direct action by the materialmen and subcontractors affected.' 94 In this case, subcontractors

188. 263 Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993).
189. Id. at 646-50, 437 S.E.2d at 330-32. For a thorough discussion of this case, see
Brian J. Morrissey, Construction Law, 46 MERCER L. REV. 117, 141-46 (1994).
190. 263 Ga. at 646,437 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-82-102) (emphasis added
by court).
191. Id. at 649, 437 S.E.2d at 331.
192. O.C.G.A. § 13-10-1(f) (Supp. 1999). The full text of the amended statue provides
as follows:
Any bid bond, performance bond, or payment bond required by this Code section
shall be approved as to form and as to the solvency of the surety by the officer of
the state, county, municipal corporation, or public board or body who negotiates
the contract on behalf of the public entity. Said approval shall be obtained prior
to the bid's being accepted.
Id. (emphasis added).
193. 231 Ga. App. 492, 498 S.E.2d 72 (1998).
194. Id. at 496, 498 S.E.2d at 76.
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working on a school construction project sued the school board for
payment under a direct action provision of public construction law. The
Hall County Board of Education hired Currahee Construction Company,
the general contractor, to construct an elementary school. The school
board required the general contractor to provide it with performance and
payment bonds for $2,590,400.'9'
During execution of the contract, the school board discovered that the
general contractor's bonds were invalid, and the school board subsequently terminated the contract. Several unpaid subcontractors, who
could not make payment claims under the invalid bonds, sued the school
board for amounts owed them for labor and materials. In connection
with cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that
questions of fact remained concerning the following issues: whether the
subcontractors could hold the school board liable for the invalidity of
bonds that were allegedly valid and in the form required by statute;
whether the school board was entitled to sovereign immunity; and
whether the subcontractors could maintain an equitable lien claim
against the school board. Cross appeals ensued."
After the school board accepted Currahee's bid, American Specialty
Insurance Company ostensibly issued performance and payment bonds
although the school board neither verified whether the bonds were valid
nor determined whether American Specialty was solvent. As the project
approached completion, the school board learned that American
Specialty had not issued the bonds; therefore, the bonds were worthless.
A subsequent investigation showed that American Specialty was no
longer authorized to issue insurance in Georgia because the Insurance
Commissioner had uncovered their unsound financial conditions. The
school board demanded that the general contractor provide valid bonds
within seven days. The general contractor failed to comply, and the
school board cancelled its contract. Ninety-eight percent of the project
had been completed at that time. 197
The court found that the school board could have discovered the
evidence concerning the financial unsoundness of the surety from the
Insurance Commissioner's office or from the surety itself.'98 Because
the school board admittedly did not conduct any investigation, the
ambiguity concerning whether the school board would have learned,
during an appropriate investigation, that the bonds were invalid allowed
a jury to infer that, had the school board conducted a proper investiga-

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 492, 498 S.E.2d at 73.
at 492-93, 498 S.E.2d at 73.
at 493-94, 498 S.E.2d at 74.
at 496, 498 S.E.2d at 76.
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tion, it could have discovered the information. 9 9 Furthermore, funds
held by the school board that belonged to the general contractor and had
not yet been paid were subject to an "equitable lien."2"'
B.

Sureties-Constructionof Obligation Strictly in Sureties' Favor

In R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Continental Insurance Co.,2 °1 the contractor
sued under a construction performance bond after the subcontractor
refused to return an overpayment. 0 2 The court of appeals faced the
issue of whether a subcontractor's performance bond, issued in favor of
the general contractor, covers the subcontractor's refusal to return the
general contractor's overpayment.2 3 The court held that under the
plain language of the subcontract and the bond, as well as a waiver and
release executed by the surety, the wrongful retention of funds was a
breach of the subcontract and therefore fell within the terms of the
bond.204
Contrary to the general rule governing construction of insurance
policies, the construction of a surety's obligation is construed strictly in
the surety's favor.20 5 Despite this fact, when the language is clear and
unambiguous, construction in the surety's favor is not permissible unless
it is consistent with the language:2' °6 The court concluded that "the
obligation to 'perform fully' includes the obligation to cure all breaches
20 7
of the subcontract, not just the physical completion of the work."
The trial court concluded that the subcontractor wrongfully retained
funds paid to it by the general contractor and had an obligation to
The
return them, and the surety did not appeal this finding. 28
subcontractor's breach of a written, direct obligation to the general
contractor permitted the general contractor to seek reimbursement from
the surety, which had expressly undertaken the obligation to "perform
fully ... in accordance with the undertakings, covenants, terms,
conditions and agreements" for the subcontractor.2 9

199. Id.
200. Id. at 498, 498 S.E.2d at 77-78.
201. 230 Ga. App. 822, 497 S.E.2d 586 (1998).
202. Id. at 822, 497 S.E.2d at 586.
203. Id. at 825, 497 S.E.2d at 588.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 823, 497 S.E.2d at 587.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 824, 497 S.E.2d at 588.
209. Id. at 825, 497 S.E.2d at 588.
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205

ARBITRATION

Arbitrator'sAuthority

In Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Trinity Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church,2 10 property owners brought a class action suit against a gas
manufacturing plant operator for property damage.21' In this case, the
court of appeals reiterated the limited statutory grounds for vacating an
arbitration award.212 The court found that even though the arbitrator
may have imperfectly made his determinations or applied state law,
these grounds were insufficient for overturning the arbitration
award. 21' Likewise, in Haddon v. Shaheen & Co.,214 an award of
attorney fees, in the absence of any provision in the contract allowing
this type of award, did not constitute a corruption in the procurement of
the award so as to require its vacation. 215 "Corruption," as a ground
for vacating an arbitration award, requires "corrupt or dishonest
proceedings."2 16
B.

Statute of Limitations

In Hardin Construction Group, Inc. v. Fuller Enterprises,Inc. ,217 the
court of appeals addressed whether the renewal statute applied to the
one-year statute of limitations for filing confirmation actions concerning
arbitration awards. 218 A federal district court dismissed a timely filed
action to confirm the arbitration award for lack of diversity jurisdiction

210. 231 Ga. App. 617, 500 S.E.2d 374 (1998).
211. Id. at 617, 500 S.E.2d at 375.
212. Id. at 618, 500 S.E.2d at 376. Arbitration awards may be vacated only for the
following reasons:
(1) Corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award;
(2) Partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral;
(3) An overstepping by the arbitrators of their authority or such imperfect
execution of it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made; or
(4) A failure to follow the procedures of this part, unless the party applying to
vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of this failure and
without objection.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) (Supp. 1999).
213. 231 Ga. App. at 619-20, 500 S.E.2d at 377-78.
214. 231 Ga. App. 596, 499 S.E.2d 693 (1998).
215. Id. at 596, 598, 499 S.E.2d at 695.
216. Id. at 597, 499 S.E.2d at 695.
217. 233 Ga. App. 717, 505 S.E.2d 755 (1998).
218. Id. at 718, 505 S.E.2d at 757.
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because the amount in controversy was less than $50,000. On appeal
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Two weeks later, Fuller
petitioned the Fulton Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award.
The court dismissed the action because of petitioner's failure to comply
substantially with the requirements of the Nonresident Contractors
Act.2 9 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal.220
Following substantial compliance with the Nonresident Contractors
Act and within six months of the affirmance of the dismissal on appeal,
Fuller refiled the confirmation proceeding in Fulton Superior Court.
Hardin sought dismissal of the action because of, among other reasons,
the expiration of the statute of limitations.221 Hardin contended that
the application was barred because it was filed two years and seven
months after Fuller received the award.222 The court found that the
limitation period was tolled during the pendency of the appeal in the
Eleventh Circuit and that Fuller timely filed the first application in
Fulton Superior Court. 22' Fuller further asserted that its second filing
was not barred by the statute of limitations because it was eligible for
the benefit of the renewal statute.2 24 The court agreed and found that
the renewal statute applies generally to arbitration confirmation
proceedings as it would to "any case."225

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. "The court shall confirm an award upon application of a party made within one
year after its delivery to him .... " O.C.G.A. § 9-9-12 (Supp. 1999).
222. 233 Ga. App. at 720, 505 S.E.2d at 758.
223. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 758-59.
224. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 759. The renewal statute provides:
(a) When any case has been commenced in either a state or federal court within
the applicable statute of limitations and the plaintiff discontinues or dismisses the
same, it may be recommenced in a court of the state or any federal court either
within the original applicable period of limitations or within six months after the
discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later, subject to the requirement of
payment of costs in the original action as required by subsection (d) of Code
Section 9-11-41; provided, however, if the dismissal or discontinuance occurs after
the expiration of the applicable period of limitation, this privilege of renewal shall
be exercised only once.
(b) This Code section shall not apply to contracts for the sale of goods covered
by Article 2 of Title 11.
(c) The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section granting a privilege of
renewal shall apply if an action is discontinued or dismissed without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction in either a court of this state or a federal court
in this state.
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (Supp. 1999).
225. 233 Ga. App. at 720-21, 505 S.E.2d at 759.
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CONCLUSION

Current economic times probably do not favor additional developments
in the lender liability area. Nonetheless, the small opening afforded to
borrowers whose lenders have not strictly complied with their contractual and tort obligations may allow more significant developments as to
lenders in the future, during an economic downturn. Further, case law
has more fully developed the law of damages in the construction field in
this state, and this trend should continue to fill gaps in Georgia law.
Finally, the courts have reaffirmed strict compliance with the requirements of the mechanic's and materialmen's lien statutes, and it may now
be time to revisit the supreme court's decision in Melton to relax some
of those requirements.

